Polishing the chains of an oppressive system: John Andrew Morrow’s ‘Controversies in Islam’, reviewed

To celebrate Ramadan 2025, and published on the Muslim holy day of Friday for double points, here is Jalal Tagreeb’s review of a recent, tortuous work of Islamic apologetics. Jalal himself is a former Muslim apologist who lost his faith after being exposed to Islam’s flaws in debates with non-Muslims. He now champions secularism and freethinking. His story and analysis of several popular Islamic arguments can be read in his Jihad by Word series, published in the Freethinker in 2024.

John Andrew Morrow’s 2023 book Controversies in Islam: Religious Law, Qur’anic Ethical Imperatives, and Higher Moral Objectives presents itself as an intellectual exploration of the supposed complexities within Islamic thought. In reality, however, the book is little more than a desperate apologetic attempt to rehabilitate Islam’s irredeemable doctrines. While Morrow feigns objectivity, his work ultimately follows the same tired pattern of Islamic revisionism: whitewashing the faith’s inherent barbarism, excusing its indefensible dogmas, and selectively reinterpreting its most troubling aspects under the guise of ‘higher moral objectives’. Far from presenting a balanced academic analysis, Controversies in Islam serves as yet another exercise in Islamic propaganda, aimed at dressing up a backward and oppressive ideology in the language of modernity and tolerance. It is a big book, so only a few of Morrow’s arguments will be dealt with here, standing in for the rest as a representative sample of laborious and unconvincing reasoning.

The chapter on the Qur’anic injunction for wife-beating (see Qur’an 4:34) is emblematic of his apologetic approach. He acknowledges that mainstream Islamic scholarship has endorsed domestic violence for centuries but insists, against all evidence, that the verse does not actually command men to beat their wives. He resorts to linguistic gymnastics, claiming that idribuhunna can mean ‘separate from them’ rather than ‘beat them’. This is the usual intellectual dishonesty employed by modern-day Islamic reformists who cannot accept the plain reading of their own scripture. If Islam was truly a faith of peace and equality, it would not require these desperate reinterpretations. Instead of condemning 4:34 outright, Morrow seeks to salvage it, proving that even so-called critics within Islam are ultimately bound by their blind loyalty to a violent and patriarchal faith.

In the chapter on Muhammad’s interactions with Jewish tribes, Morrow whitewashes the Prophet’s genocidal actions against the Banu Qurayza. Morrow attempts to cast doubt on the well-documented massacre of Jewish men and the enslavement of their women and children, citing revisionist sources that claim the event never occurred. This is a blatant attempt to rewrite history to make for a more palatable narrative. (Even if it did not happen, it is an established part in the Islamic historical and legal tradition.) Muhammad’s treatment of Jews was not one of tolerance but of calculated political expediency. Like any old conqueror and politician, he made treaties and alliances when it suited him and slaughtered entire communities when they became inconvenient. The suggestion that Islam historically promoted harmonious Jewish-Muslim relations is laughable given Islam’s deeply ingrained anti-Semitic doctrines, from the Qur’an’s condemnation of Jews as ‘apes’ and ‘pigs’ (see Qur’an 2:65, 5:60, 7:166) to its numerous calls for their subjugation.

The chapter entitled ‘Jihad, Terrorism, War, and Peace’ attempts to reinterpret jihad as a moral struggle rooted in justice and self-defence. However, when examined through the lens of modern secular ideals, its arguments crumble. In an era defined by reason, debate, and universal principles, the concept of jihad has been rendered both intellectually obsolete and morally indefensible. The depiction of jihad as a mechanism for justice is inherently contradictory. It claims to uphold rights and freedoms, yet these are limited to those who conform to Islamic authority. The rights protected under jihad are conditional, privileging Muslims and relegating non-Muslims to a subordinate status.

The author’s historical context, which casts the Prophet’s military campaigns as necessary for justice, is selective at best. It ignores the political motivations underpinning these actions, cloaking them in moral rhetoric that does not stand up to scrutiny. Secularism, by contrast, champions justice without bias or coercion, making it clear that equality does not require religious sanction. Furthermore, we notice that the author fails to acknowledge the growing irrelevance of jihad in the modern intellectual arena. Secularism has decisively outmatched religious doctrines, including jihad, in providing frameworks for justice and coexistence. The idea that jihad protects the ‘People of the Book’ is undermined by the discriminatory practices found under Islamic authorities throughout history, such as the imposition of the jizyah tax, which starkly contrasts with the impartiality of secular systems.

Through debate and reason, secularism has exposed jihad’s moral and logical shortcomings. While jihad relies on theological premises, secularism operates on universally accessible principles rooted in reason and empathy. This intellectual and moral superiority has ensured that jihad remains a relic of the past, unable to compete in the open marketplace of ideas.

On many occasions, the author engages in historical revisionism, presenting jihad as a noble struggle to protect the oppressed and uphold treaties. However, a closer examination reveals that these conflicts often served as tools for political and territorial expansion rather than genuine justice. For instance, the Prophet’s campaigns against the Jewish tribes of Medina are portrayed as responses to treachery, yet they resulted in subjugation and destruction. Similarly, wars against polytheists and Byzantines are framed as defensive, but their outcomes reveal the imposition of Islamic authority. These examples highlight the limitations of jihad as a framework for justice, especially when contrasted with secularism’s commitment to genuine equality and coexistence. The author has clearly overlooked the decisive triumph of secular ideals over jihad in modern times. Secularism has demonstrated that justice, freedom, and peace are best achieved through dialogue, diplomacy, and reasoned governance, not through theological mandates or warfare. The word has triumphed over the sword, and secularism stands as the enduring victor.

Morrow’s discussion of jihad follows the predictable pattern of every modern Islamic apologist: he downplays its violent and expansionist nature while presenting an unconvincing distinction between ‘greater jihad’ (spiritual struggle) and ‘lesser jihad’ (armed struggle). This distinction, often cited by reformists, has no basis in the Qur’an or hadith, where jihad is overwhelmingly associated with warfare against non-Muslims. Islam’s alleged commitment to peace is contingent upon the submission of non-Muslims to Islamic rule, a reality confirmed by centuries of Islamic imperialism and conquest. Morrow’s failure to acknowledge this renders his analysis disingenuous at best and complicit at worst.

The author dedicates an entire chapter to gender relations, attempting to portray Islam as a progressive force for women’s rights. This claim is absurd given that the Qur’an itself institutionalises gender inequality, from the sanctioning of polygyny (Qur’an 4:3) to the devaluation of women’s testimony in court (Qur’an 2:282). Morrow’s argument relies heavily on cherry-picked interpretations that conveniently ignore centuries of Islamic jurisprudence reinforcing women’s subjugation. If Islam truly upheld women’s dignity, it would not require endless reinterpretations and apologetics to justify its teachings.

The book’s attempts to reconcile Islam with pluralism are laughable. Morrow insists that the Qur’an promotes interfaith harmony, but he conveniently glosses over verses such as Qur’an 9:29, which commands Muslims to fight non-believers until they submit and pay the humiliating jizyah tax. He cites the ‘Covenants of the Prophet’ as evidence of Islamic tolerance, despite the fact that these documents are of dubious authenticity and contradict mainstream Islamic teachings. The reality is that Islam’s so-called pluralism is a myth, one that crumbles under the weight of its own theological supremacism. Morrow’s claim that the Covenants and other Islamic documents inspired modern documents such as the US Bill of Rights is a denial of the latter’s true secular, philosophical origins—an attempt to retroactively claim credit for secularism, human rights, and modernity, redolent of the desperate attempts of many an Islamic apologist to claim that modern scientific findings are actually to be found in the Qur’an. Ad hoc apologetics at their finest.

Throughout Controversies in Islam, Morrow swings wildly between condemning extremist interpretations of Islam and insisting that Islam itself is a peaceful and ethical system. This is the fundamental contradiction of Islamic apologetics: Islam cannot be the perfect and final revelation of divine truth and yet require constant reinterpretation to align with modern ethical standards. Either the Qur’an is an unchangeable, divinely inspired text, in which case its numerous violent, sexist, and intolerant passages must be accepted as they are, or it is a flawed and outdated document unworthy of modern moral consideration. Morrow’s failure to resolve this contradiction renders his work not only intellectually weak but morally bankrupt.¹

In the end, Controversies in Islam is yet another failed attempt to reform and rehabilitate an inherently regressive ideology. Morrow, like many Islamic apologists before him, refuses to acknowledge the core problems within Islam and instead offers revisionist history, selective reinterpretations, and outright denial of inconvenient facts. He is worried that if Islam ‘fails to be reformed, namely, realigned with reason, ethical imperatives, and higher moral objectives, most Muslims will embrace secular liberalism and humanism in relatively short order.’ The horror!

He is right, of course, that ‘Radical, political, Islam is not a viable option’, but why not just avoid all the twisting and writhing of apologetics, accept that Islam is false and full of illiberal and anti-human ideas, and embrace secular modernity? If Islam needs to be ‘realigned with reason, ethical imperatives, and higher moral objectives’, what exactly is the point of this exercise? We already have reason, ethics, and morality; there is no need to try and force ancient documents to fit the mould. Anyway, Islam doesn’t need to be ‘realigned’ with these things; it could do with being aligned with them in the first place, which means, essentially, rejecting faith and revelation and the notion of perfect holy books—in other words, Islam itself. Morrow’s very desperation to make Islam palatable to secular modernity shows the superiority of secular modernity—and no prophet or divine text is needed, after all. And the very attempt to show the Qur’an’s compatibility with secular modernity is simply another attempt, despite some unconvincing prestidigitation, to make the Qur’an perfect, final, and unalterable.

Thus, and perhaps worst of all, by effectively clinging to the view that the Qur’an is perfect, Morrow essentially surrenders to the Islamists he opposes and reinscribes Islamic and Qur’anic supremacism by the back door: See? The Qur’an really is perfect, Islam really is all you need to create and sustain a viable society! Oh, and we Muslims inspired the US Bill of Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, didn’t you know? Pride in such inspiration aside, this attitude is fundamentally the same as that of the Islamists.

The book is not a bold critique of Islam’s controversies—it is an elaborate exercise in damage control. Those who seek an honest and unflinching analysis of Islam’s moral and intellectual failures will find nothing of value in this work. Instead of confronting Islam’s undeniable flaws, Morrow merely polishes the chains of an oppressive system, hoping that a fresh coat of paint will somehow make them acceptable. I hope that reading this critique by a former lion of dawah (calling others to the faith) will persuade some of those still beholden to the delusion of Islam to think more freely.

1. In chapter 15, ‘Reason and Revelation’, there is a fascinating example of the weird reasoning of the religious mind at work:
   
   If we believe the teachings that are attributed to the Imams, then the Qur’an, as we know it, and as it has been interpreted, is not the Qur’an as it was intended. This does not necessarily mean that the words have been changed. It does mean that some of them have been misinterpreted and misconstrued.
   
   If this is indeed the case, then many interpretations of Islam are incorrect. Why? Because the Qur’an, the hadith, the shari‘ah, and Islam as a whole have been used to derive unethical rules, regulations, and laws. So, unless God is Unjust and Unethical, then the edicts issued by certain jurists cannot possibly reflect the ethical intent of the Divinity. As Takim puts it, “a God who has anchored and instilled His will in the human conscience cannot endorse immoral laws or acts or to be unjust to His creatures”.
   
   Many interpretations of Islam are unjust and unethical by many ethical (particularly modern, secular) standards; God is not unjust and unethical; therefore the Qur’an must have meant something different—it must have meant to express ethical standards which we (I) today approve of. Hey presto!
   
   As an aside, there are hints of the Euthyphro Dilemma here. Not to mention the problems of divine command theory. If God had meant to subjugate women, for example, wouldn’t that simply make the subjugation of women ethical? Is Morrow challenging God’s notion of the ethical, then? He knows what is ethical, and he judges God and the Qur’an by those standards, but who is he to say that God’s commands are unethical? Is this assumption not blasphemous? Well, I of course know what is ethical, and God is ethical, and therefore the oppressive interpretations of Islam cannot be true.
   
   Such athleticism! What a relief it is not to have to torture one’s mind with all this; what a relief, and how much more useful it is, to be able to simply consider ethics and truth. ↩︎